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JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to section 78-2a-3(2)(j) UTAH 
CODEANN.(1996) . 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
A. Issues. 
Appellant Margaret Kilpatrick and her now deceased husband, James Kilpatrick, 
filed a claim for personal injury and loss of consortium based on Mr. Kiipatrick's 
asbestos-related disease. After Mr- Kilpatrick died, Mrs. Kilpatrick was substituted as 
named plaintiff and amended her complaint to add actions for survival and wrongful 
death in her capacity as representative of the legal heirs of James Kilpatrick. Defendants 
moved to dismiss ail plaintiffs' claims for failure to comply with the court's Case 
Management Order No. L which requires an autopsy be conducted upon the death of any 
plaintiff in an asbestos case. The court's decision to dismiss the plaintiffs entire action 
based on failure to conduct an autopsy on the body of James Kilpatrick raises the 
following issues: 
1. Did the court abuse its discretion and commit reversible error when it granted 
the defendants' Motion to Dismiss as a discovery sanction without evidence of fault on 
the part of the Plaintiffs? 
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2. Did the court commit reversible error in granting Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss for failure to perform an autopsy when Appellants had other medical evidence to 
support their claims? 
B. Standards of Review. 
3. Did the court commit reversible error when it denied the decedent's legal heirs 
their right to a trial based on an alleged violation of a discovery order to which they were 
not subject? 
Whether the court properly granted the motion to dismiss is a question of law, 
which the Court of Appeals reviews for correctness, giving no deference to the decision 
of the court. Peterson v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 2002 UT App 56, ^ | 7, 42 P3d 1253. 
Imposition of discovery sanctions is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Tuck v. 
Godfrey, 1999 UT App 127, \ 15, 981 P.2d 407. The striking of pleadings, entering of 
default, and rendering of judgment against a disobedient party are the most severe of the 
potential sanctions that can be imposed upon a nonresponding party. Because of the 
severity of this type of sanction, "the Trial Court's range of discretion is more narrow than 
when the court is imposing less severe sanctions." Marshall v. Marshall 915 P.2d 508, 
515 (Utah App., 1996). Imposing sanctions for a party's refusal to respond to a court order 
compelling discovery is a harsh sanction and therefore, requires "a showing of 
'willfulness, bad faith, or fault' on the part of the non-complying party/" First Federal 
Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Salt Lake City v. Schamanek, 684 P.2d 1257 (Utah 1984) (quoting 
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Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 US. 197, 78 S.Ct 1087, 2 L.EcL2d 1255 (1958)). 
"Willful failure7' has been defined as u 'any intentional failure as distinguished from 
involuntary noncompliance, ""Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler 768 P.2d 950, 961 -962 
(Utah App., 1989). 
These issues were raised by the defendants in their motions to dismiss (R. 1497-
1500; 1764-1769), the memoranda and other papers filed by the parties in support of and 
in opposition to defendants^ motions (R. 1501-1602;1607-1615; 1770-1787; 1788-1792), 
and at the hearing on the motion. (R. 1812). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES OR RULES 
1. The Utah Constitution, Article I, section 11 is determinative of this issue and 
provides as follows: 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person, 
property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be 
administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from 
prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil 
cause to which he is a party. 
U.CA. 1953, Const Art. 1, § 11 
2. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 37 is determinative of this issue and provides as 
follows: 
3 
RULE 37. FAILURE TO MAKE OR COOPERATE IN DISCOVERY; 
SANCTIONS 
=J= * * 
(b) Failure to comply with order. 
# ^ * 
(2) Sanctions by court in which action is pending. If a party or an officer, director, 
or managing agent of a party or a person designated under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to 
testify on behalf of a party fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery, including 
an order made under Subdivision (a) of this rule or Rule 35, or if a party fails to obey an 
order entered under Rule 16(b), the court in which the action is pending may make such 
orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among others the following: 
(A) an order that the matters regarding which the order was made or any other designated 
facts shall be taken to be established for the purposes of the action in accordance with the 
claim of the party obtaining the order; 
(B) an order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose designated 
claims or defenses, or prohibiting him from introducing designated matters in evidence; 
(C) an order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, staying further proceedings until the 
order is obeyed, dismissing the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a 
judgment by default against the disobedient party; 
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(D) in lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, an order treating as a 
contempt of court the failure to obey any orders except an order to submit to a physical or 
mental examination; 
(E) where a party has failed to comply with an order under Rule 35(a), such orders as are 
listed in Paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of this subdivision, unless the party failing to 
comply is unable to produce such person for examination. 
In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, the court shall require the 
party failing to obe}' the order or the attorney or both of them to pay the reasonable 
expenses, including attorney fees, caused by the failure, unless the court finds that the 
failure was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses 
unjust. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Court 
Below. 
This case began as a claim for personal injury and loss of consortium resulting 
from exposure to asbestos and asbestos-containing products. After the plaintiff died, his 
spouse was substituted as the named plaintiff She amended her complaint to include 
causes of action for survival and wrongful death on behalf of the heirs. The defendants 
moved to dismiss the case based on violation of the courf s Case Management Order No. 
1 which requires that in all asbestos cases, upon a plaintiffs death, his spouse or other 
representative is required to produce the body for a full autopsy. At the time the 
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defendant's motion was filed, the plaintiff had been dead for over two years, no autopsy 
had been conducted, and his body had been cremated. 
The court determined that the failure to have an autopsy conducted was a violation 
of the disco very provisions of its case management order and required dismissal of 
plaintiffs claims. The court entered an order dismissing the plaintiffs' claims against the 
moving defendant. A subsequent motion put forth by additional defendants on the same 
grounds was decided based on the court's prior memorandum decision, and the plaintiffs' 
claims against those defendants were also dismissed. 
B- Statement of Facts 
Plaintiffs James and Margaret Kilpatrick fded their complaint for personal injury 
and loss of consortium on February 9, 2001. (R. 1). They alleged injuries to James 
resulting from exposure to asbestos and asbestos-containing products, and loss of 
consortium. (R. 1-55). On May 7, 2001, the court adopted its Case Management Order 
No.l, which applies to all cases alleging injury due to exposure to asbestos. (Addendum). 
In compliance with the court's order, James Kilpatrick signed an authorization for his 
counsel to procure a full and complete autopsy upon his death (R. 1532). That 
authorization was not signed by Mrs. Kilpatrick and she had no knowledge of it (Id.) 
James Kilpatrick died on July 5, 2003. ( R. 1534). No autopsy was conducted, and Mr. 
Kilpatrick's body was cremated. (Id.) 
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On April 1, 2004, Margaret Kilpatrick filed a motion to substitute her as the named 
plaintiff. (R. 1378 - 1380). The court entered an order to this end on May 27, 2004. (R. 
1426 - 1428). Mrs. Kilpatrick filed her second amended complaint for survival, loss of 
consortium, and wrongful death on June 23, 2004. (R. 1437 - 1446). Defendant 
Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Company's ("BNRR'*) answer to the second 
amended complaint was filed on August 12, 2004 (R1447 - 1452). On October 13, 2005, 
more than two years after James Kilpatrick's death, defendant BNRR filed a motion to 
dismiss all of plaintiffs' claims for failure to comply with Case Management Order No. 1. 
(R1497 - 1500). Specifically, defendant claimed plaintiffs' case must be dismissed for 
failure to provide the body of James Kilpatrick for autopsy as required by Case 
Management Order No. 1, section III, paragraph 5.a. (R. 1502) That paragraph provides 
as follows: 
"Plaintiffs spouse or another of plaintiff s representatives shall produce the 
body of the deceased for one full and complete autopsy, including the 
thoracic and abdominal cavities, to be performed by the State medical 
examiner or a competent pathologist designated by plaintiffs counsel 
unless otherwise ordered by the court upon good cause shown/' 
This case management order was adopted by the court on May 7, 2001 and was amended 
September 30, 2003. (Addendum). It is routinely applicable to all asbestos cases filed in 
Salt Lake County by the Brayton ••• Purcell, LLP firm. 
Plaintiffs opposed the motion noting that there was no evidence of fault in Mrs. 
Kilpatrick^ s failure to procure an autopsy. (R. 1518-1604). Mrs. Kilpatrick provided a 
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sworn and notarized affidavit that she had been unaware that her husband had agreed to 
have an autopsy conducted. (R. 1605-1606). She further noted that by the time she 
notified her attorneys of her husband's death, he had already been cremated. (Id). 
On March 3, 2006, the court issued a memorandum decision in which it 
determined that the failure to obtain an autopsy of Mr. Kilpatrick was prejudicial to the 
defendants and their ability to defend against the claims that Mr. Kilpatrick suffered from 
an asbestos-related disease. (R. 1633-1637; Addendum). On March 21, 2006, the court 
entered an order dismissing defendant BNRR. (R. 1638-1641). 
On August 4, 2006 defendant Bullough Abatement, Inc. filed its motion to 
dismiss all claims for failure to perform an autopsy. (R1764-1769). Plaintiffs again 
opposed the motion to dismiss and the court again granted the dismissal On September 
21,2006 the court filed a minute entry granting the motion to dismiss on the basis of the 
memorandum of decision previously filed in response to the motion by BNRR. (R.1797-
1798). Plaintiffs filed their Notice of Appeal on September 26, 2006. (R. 1799-1801). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The court abused its discretion in granting the dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims 
for failure to comply with Case Management Order No. 1. While Utah law extends the 
court great discretion in imposition of discovery sanctions, that discretion is not absolute. 
"As an initial matter, before imposing sanctions..., 'the court must find on the part of 
the noncomplying party willfulness, bad faith, or fault, or persistent dilatory tactics 
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frustrating the judicial process.'" Hales v. Oldroyd 999 P.2d 588, 592 (Utah 2000). 
Nothing in the evidentiary record supports any finding that there was willfulness, bad 
faith, or fault, or persistent dilatory tactics on the part of Mrs. Kilpatrick or any other 
plaintiff. 
Even if the court finds there is no abuse of discretion in applying the order, the 
court must reverse the decision of the court because the case management order itself 
exceeds the court's authority. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 35, which authorizes physical 
examination of the person of the plaintiff, requires the party seeking the examination to 
demonstrate good cause for the examination U.R.CP. 37 (2006). The court's order 
requiring an autopsy, a much more intrusive and abusive examination, reverses that 
burden and places on the nonmoving party the burden to demonstrate good cause not to 
conduct an autopsy- The State of Utah maintains a preference in its law against requiring 
an autopsy because of the intrusive nature of that procedure. Further, the court's order is 
not specific to the facts of any individual case but applies without limitation to all 
asbestos cases. Without evidence of the necessity for an autopsy in an individual case, 
imposition of a blanket order imposing an autopsy requirement in all cases is an abuse of 
the court's authority. 
If this court finds that the court's order is permissible under Utah law, application 
of that order to the plaintiffs in this case is inappropriate. The action in which this order 
was enforced, and in which dismissal was ordered, is a wrongful death action. The 
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plaintiffs in this action, Mrs. Kilpatrick and the legal heirs of James Kilpatrick, were 
unaware of the existence of the court's case management order, and the requirement that 
an autopsy be conducted. By the time they informed their counsel of the death of James 
Kilpatrick, his body had already been cremated. The legal heirs of James Kilpatrick were 
not parties to the personal injury case in which the case management order was imposed. 
It was in that case, prior to the amendment for wrongful death, in which the order was 
allegedly violated 
No plaintiff in the wrongful death case violated the court's order to conduct an 
autopsy of James Kilpatrick. Those plaintiffs did not have a cause of action until James 
Kilpatrick died, they had not asserted their cause of action until well after his body had 
been cremated, and they had no ability to comply with any order to conduct an autopsy of 
his body. Imposition of that order to dismiss their cause of action exceeds the court's 
authority, is an abuse of discretion, and violates the plaintiffs' Constitutional right to have 
their claims heard in court. 
Further, even if the court's case management order was appropriate, its 
imposition in this case was inappropriate. There is no barm to the defendants by the 
failure to obtain an autopsy. This case stands today in the exact posture it would have 
been had there been no personal injury case. Had James Kilpatrick simply died from the 
effects of his exposure to asbestos, and had his heirs asserted their rights to damages 
under the law of Utah based on that death, these defendants would have been in the same 
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circumstances that they are in today. The simple fact that James Kilatrick asserted a 
claim in his own right before he died does not deprive the defendants of any relevant 
wrongful death evidence in this case. Plaintiffs in this case still have the burden to 
demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the decedent suffered from asbestos-
related disease for which the defendants are responsible and which caused his death. That 
burden is not changed in the absence of an autopsy in this case. There is other substantial 
evidence of causation on which to proceed. If, as the Defense claims, there is substantial 
evidence calling into question the existence of an asbestos related disease, that evidence 
is not adversely affected by the lack of autopsy results. Because neither side is prejudiced 
by the absence of an autopsy, because the burden on the plaintiffs to prove their case 
remains the same, it was an abuse of discretion in excess of the courts authority to order 
dismissal of the plaintiffs' claim in this case. 
Finally, the court's reliance on the Federal Employers' Liability Act ("FELA") as 
an additional ground for dismissing plaintiffs' survival and wrongful death claims is in 
error because James Kilpatrick did not violate any discovery order which would have 
effected his rights under the FELA. Moreover, Mr. Kilpatrick had viable and ongoing 
FELA claims at the time of his death, when the case management order was allegedly 
violated, an action he was incapable of causing. Accordingly, this court should reverse 
the decision of the court and remand the case for discovery and trial 
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ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS FOR 
FAILING TO PRODUCE THE BODY OF JAMES KILPATRICK FOR AN 
AUTOPSY 
A. The Court's Action Was Improper Because the Record Fails to Demonstrate 
Any Fault on the Part of the Plaintiffs Which Would Support a Sanction of 
Dismissal. 
The court dismissed the plaintiffs claim as a sanction for failure to comply with 
the court's case management order which requires that when a personal injury plaintiff in 
an asbestos-related lawsuit dies, his spouse or other representative must produce the body 
for an autopsy. This requirement is contained in the section of the court's Case 
Management Order No, 1 which is entitled "Additional Discovery." (Addendum). It is 
intended to be a discovery order. See, Preston & Chambers, P.C. v. Koller, 1997, 943 
P.2d 260 [while ruling was not designated as an order compelling discovery, that was 
inarguably the substance of the order.] Accordingly, the dismissal for failure to comply 
with that portion of the order is a discovery sanction. Under Utah law, however, to 
impose a discovery sanction of dismissal, there must be a showing that the party being 
sanctioned is at fault. No such showing was made in this case. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 37 permits imposition of dismissal as a sanction in 
discovery. (Utah R. Civ.P. 37(b)(2)(C)) (2006). Utah courts have long held that courts 
have wide discretion in imposing the appropriate sanctions for violation of discovery 
rules. Tuck v. Godfrey, 1999 UT App 127, \ 15, 981 P.2d 407; see also Utah Dep't of 
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Transp. v. Osguthorpe, 892 P,2d 4, 6 (Utah 1995). But, the discretion of the court in 
imposing sanctions for violations of discovery orders is not unbridled. 
The striking of pleadings, entering of default, and rendering of judgment 
against a disobedient part}' are the most severe of the potential sanctions 
that can be imposed upon a nonresponding party. Because of the severity of 
this type of sanction, 'the trial court's range of discretion is more narrow 
than when the court is imposing less severe sanctions." 
Marshallv. Marshall 915 P.2d 508, 515 (Utah App.1996). As the United States 
Supreme Court (as well as Utah Courts) has pointed out: 
Imposing sanctions for a party's refusal to respond to a court order 
compelling discovery is a harsh sanction and therefore, requires ika showing 
of'willfulness, bad faith, or fault' on the part of the non-complying party." 
Fed. Sav, & Loan Ass% 684 P.2d at 1266 (quoting Societe Internationale v. 
Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 78 S.CL 1087, 2 L.Ed2d 1255 (1958)). "Willful 
failure" has been defined as "c 'any intentional failure as distinguished from 
involuntary noncompliance.'" 
Arnica Mut Ins. Co. v. Schettler 768 P.2d 950, 961 -962 (Utah App.,1989). 
The court's action dismissing the claims of the plaintiffs in this case is an abuse 
of discretion because the record is totally devoid of any willfulness, bad faith, or fault on 
the part of any of the plaintiffs. Neither the moving party's motion, nor the argument in 
the court on the motions, nor the courts memorandum of decision point to any willfulness, 
bad faith, or fault. The only point raised by the defendants, and the only support relied 
upon by the court was the simple absence of an autopsy. The defendants did not attempt 
to demonstrate, nor did the court find any fault on the part of the plaintiffs. 
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The court's failure to find willfulness, bad faith, or fault is due to the simple fact 
that there was none. The unchallenged facts show that Mrs. Kilpatrick was unaware that 
her husband had signed an autopsy authorization. (R. 1605-1606). Mrs. Kilpatrick was 
unaware that the court expected an autopsy to be conducted. By the time Mrs. Kilpatrick 
informed her attorneys that her husband had died, he had already been cremated. {Id.) At 
that point, there was nothing any plaintiff could do, there was nothing that counsel could 
do, to comply with an order to produce the body for autopsy. There is no evidence that 
this failure was anything but unconscious, unknowing, and without fault. Because the 
court failed to find the predicate elements necessary to support a sanction of dismissal, 
that sanction was an abuse of discretion and must be reversed. 
The inappropriateness of the sanction of dismissal in this case is further 
demonstrated by the frequently stated purpose behind the imposition of discovery 
sanctions. cc[S]anctions are intended to deter misconduct in connection with discovery. 
First Federal Sav. & Loan Ass1n of Salt Lake City v. Schamanek, 684 P.2d 1257, 1266 
(Utah,1984)(C//z>7£ National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., All U.S. 
639, 1976). See also, Utah Dep'tofTransp. v. Osguthorpe, 892 P.2d4, 8 (Utah 1995). 
Surely there is no misconduct to deter in this case. No sanction the court could impose 
will enable this widow to turn back the clock and order an autopsy, nor is it likely to make 
her more compliant on the next such occasion. The sanction is unwarranted under the law 
of this state. As such, it is an abuse of discretion and must be overturned. 
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B. The Trial Court's Case Management Order, Requiring an Autopsy in Every 
Asbestos Case in Which the Plaintiff Dies, Exceeds the Trial Court's Legal 
Authority and Must Be Stricken. 
Plaintiffs have demonstrated that the court inappropriately struck their claims as a 
discovery sanction. If this court somehow concludes that imposition of a discovery 
sanction was appropriate under the facts of this case, it must nonetheless reverse the 
judgment of the court because the case management order itself exceeds the court's 
authority. 
The Utah Supreme Court has long recognized that "since the most ancient of times 
people have had a reverent regard for the remains of their loved ones..., and this naturally 
includes an ardent desire that their remains be treated with respect and allowed to remain 
in undisturbed peace/' Smart v. Moyer, 577 P.2d 108 (Utah 1978). For this reason, the 
authority to order an autopsy is limited in statute, and infrequently exercised.1 Even in 
lCases in which an autopsy is either required or permitted are set out in statute as 
follows: 
(1) The medical examiner shall perform an autopsy to: 
(a) aid in the disco very and prosecution of a crime; 
(b) protect an innocent person accused of a crime; and 
(c) disclose hazards to public health. 
(2) The medical examiner may perform an autopsy: 
(a) to aid in the administration of civil justice in life and accident insurance problems in 
accordance with Title 34A, Chapter 2, Workers1 Compensation Act; 
(b) in other cases involving questions of civil liability. 
U.C.A. §26-4-13(1953) 
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cnose cases in which statute provides authority to direct an autopsy, the Supreme Court 
has recognized that such provisions do not provide an "absolute right" to litigants to have 
an autopsy performed. Rather, the authority must be exercised with discretion. Silver 
King Coalition Mines Co. V. Industrial Commission, 204 P.2d 811, (Utah 1949). 
A similar limitation exists in Utah rule of Civil Procedure 35 which provides for 
physical examination of the person of the plaintiff in appropriate situations U.R.C.P. 35 
(2006). Rule 35 provides that an order for such an examination may be entered only after 
a motion and "upon good, cause shown."2 In this case, the court's order for an autopsy is 
an order for a physical examination of the body. But, in an ironic twist, that order does 
not require the party seeking the autopsy to show good cause that it be ordered. Rather, 
the court's order reverses the burden and imposes upon the party being examined a 
requirement that it demonstrate good cause why no such examination should be 
conducted. Because this court's order reverses the burden imposed by Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 35, it exceeds the authority of the court and must therefore be stricken as 
inappropriate. 
2Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 35(a) Order for Examination- When the mental 
or physical condition (including the blood group) of a party or of a person in the custody 
or under the legal control of a party is in controversy, the court in which the action is 
pending may order the party or person to submit to a physical or mental examination by a 
suitably licensed or certified examiner or to produce for examination the person in the 
party's custody or legal control. The order may be made only on motion for good cause 
shown and upon notice to the person to be examined and to all parties and shall specify 
the time, place, manner, conditions, and scope of the examination and the person or 
persons by whom it is to be made. (Emphasis added) 
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Finally, the court's order exceeded its authority because it is not specific to the 
facts of each individual case. While the law recognizes, and plaintiffs freely admit, that 
an order to conduct an autopsy may be appropriate in certain cases, it is certainly not a 
requirement, nor is it appropriate, in every asbestos case. Nothing in the court's order 
clarifies or explains or defines those factors which will or will not make an autopsy 
appropriate. The right to order an autopsy requires a sound exercise of discretion. Silver 
King Coalition Mines, supra, 204 P.2d at 815-16. The order in question here eliminates 
all exercise of discretion by the court. It directs an autopsy in each and every case. 
Because the order eliminates that exercise of discretion, it violates the underlying 
statutory authority and it is invalid. Accordingly the courf s order exceeds its authority 
and must be invalidated by this court. 
C The Trial Court Erred in Dismissing Plaintiffs' Claims Because the Wrongful 
Death Plaintiffs Had No Ability to Comply with the Court's Order, 
At the time Margaret Kilpatrick was substituted as the named plaintiff in this case, 
and the complaint was amended to add causes of action for survival and wrongful death, 
it was too late to conduct an autopsy on the body of James Kilpatrick. Mr. Kilpatrick's 
body had already been cremated. (R. 1518-1604, R. 1605-1606) Despite this fact and 
despite the fact that the wrongful death plaintiffs, the heirs of Mr, Kilpatrick, had never 
had a chance to be subject to the court's jurisdiction, the court's order nonetheless struck 
their claim without any recourse. This decision was a violation of the wrongful death 
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plaintiffs right under the Utah Constitution to have their claims heard in the court. 
Accordingly, the court's order must be reversed. 
The Utah Constitution, article 11, section 3, provides each individual the right to 
have his or her claim heard in the court (935). The legal heirs of Mr. Kiipatrick were 
denied that right by the court's decision dismissing the action. They had no ability to 
comply with the court's order. It was not an order to which they were ever subject prior 
to the cremation of Mr. Kiipatrick. In an, analogous situation the Court held: 
a person who puts forth every reasonable effort to comply with a court order 
and still is unable to do so, is not guilty of contempt on account of such 
failure. 
Limb v. Limb, 113 Utah 385, 389, 195 P.2d 263, 265 (1948); See, alsoJeppson v. 
Jeppson, 597 P.2d 1345 (1975). 
An order which is incapable of being obeyed cannot be a valid order. The 
application of this fact is incorporated in Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 37. As noted 
above, Rule 37 authorizes imposition of sanctions for failure to cooperate in discovery. 
In addressing the sanctions available for failing to permit a physical examination of the 
plaintiff ordered under Rule 35, the rule provides: 
(E) where a party has failed to comply with an order under Rule 35(a), such 
orders as are listed in Paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of this subdivision, 
unless the party failing to comply is unable to produce such person for 
examination. (2006) 
The circumstance contemplated by this rule is exactly the circumstance which pertains 
here. The legal heirs of Mr. Kiipatrick had no ability to produce his body for 
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examination. By the time their claim was filed the body was already cremated. Yet, 
despite the plain language of the rule that in such circumstance an order dismissing the 
complaint is not appropriate, the court dismissed their claims. In so doing, the court 
deprived them of their Constitutional right to have their claims heard in the court. 
Because the courf s order was without support in the law, and because the effect of that 
order was to deprive plaintiffs of their Constitutional right, the court's order must be 
stricken and the judgment reversed. 
D. The Trial Court Erred in Striking Plaintiffs' Complaint Because 
it Erroneously Concluded That Defendants Were Prejudiced by 
the Lack of an Autopsy. 
In its memorandum decision granting the motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims, 
the court explained that the lack of an autopsy was prejudicial to the defendants in this 
matter. That conclusion, which fonns the support for the court's decision, is factually in 
error. The lack of an autopsy in this case has not in any way prejudiced the defendants. 
The defendants, and indeed the court, seem to believe that an autopsy would 
provide conclusive proof of causation in this case. However, the law does not require 
conclusive proof of causation. Rather it requires proof by a preponderance of the 
evidence. There is significant other evidence in the case to meet this burden. 
Other courts have recognized that autopsy results are not necessary to prove 
causation. In Hess v Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 795 RE.2d 91 (Ohio CL App 2003), the 
plaintiffs were exposed to asbestos while working for the defendant railroad. The 
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defendant requested that the family of each plaintiff conduct a limited autopsy of the 
lungs and pleura. On appeal the defendant argued that because counsel for the plaintiffs 
failed to notify it of the autopsies, it missed its chance to conduct a full autopsy to 
detennine the cause of death and moved to exclude any testimony relevant to the cause of 
death due to spoliation of the evidence. Rejecting the defendant's motion and argument 
that they were prejudiced, the court stated that "independent evidence pertaining to the 
cause of death of each of the [plaintiffs] was established by their individual death 
certificates, through testimony from expert witnesses, and through their medical records. 
It would have been improper for the court to exclude all evidence as to the cause of death 
simply because a full autopsy had not been completed.5' {Id, at 100). 
As in the Hess case, other independent evidence relating to Mr. Kiipatrick's cause 
of death is available to the parties here. In opposition to defendants' motion to dismiss, 
plaintiffs provided copies of reports from expert witnesses who would be expected to 
testify as to the nature of Mr. Kiipatrick's illness and the cause of death. Medical records 
from the University of Utah Medical Center, Lakeview Hospital and Mr. Kiipatrick's 
treating physicians exist, as well as the tissue from the biopsies. (R. 1600-1601). There 
was an examination and resulting death certificate for Mr. Kiipatrick. Equally 
importantly, the defendants had more than two years to conduct their own Rule 35 
examination of Mr. Kiipatrick and they chose not to request the exam. 
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Moreover, the conduct of, or failure to conduct an autopsy does not alter the 
burden of proof standards for civil injury and wrongful death claim. Plaintiffs must prove 
by a preponderance of the evidence that the injury or death is caused by the exposure to 
asbestos. In Alder v. Bayer Corporation, 61 P.3d 1068, 1085 (Utah, 2002), the Utah 
Supreme court gave insightful instruction on how Utah courts should address causation 
issues in toxic tort claims. The Court said: 
Individuals routinely feel the effects of a wide array of common phenomena 
whose mechanisms remain unexplained by science, including, for example, 
the law of gravity, the nature of light, the source of personality, and the 
process of ceil differentiation. If a bicyclist falls and breaks his arm, 
causation is assumed without argument because of the temporal 
relationship between the accident and the injury. The law does not object 
tliat no one measured the exact magnitude and angle of the forces applied 
to the bone. . Legally, an observable sequence of condition > event > 
altered condition, has been found sufficient to establish causation even 
when the exact mechanism is unknown. 
The Court ended its discussion by advising Utah courts that plaintiffs with toxic 
exposures "enjoy the opportunity to prove that which they can, as do those of more 
prosaic injuries/' Id Plaintiffs have sufficient evidence to prove that asbestos exposure 
caused Mr. Kilpatrickf s death. The burden of proof is a preponderance of the evidence 
and plaintiffs are to "enjoy the opportunity to prove that which they can." Here, plaintiffs 
should be granted the same opportunity as the plaintiffs in Alder, to put forth the evidence 
that exists to a finder of fact to determine whether the evidence establishes that Mr 
Kiipatrick's death was more likely than not caused by his exposure to asbestos for which 
the defendants are responsible. 
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E, The Trial Court's Reliance on the FELA as a Basis for Dismissing the 
Plaintiffs5 Claims was Error Because James Kilpatrick Did Not Violate the 
Case Management Order 
By stipulation, plaintiffs' claims against defendant BNRR were limited to those 
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA). (R. 1469-1472). The court focused 
on this limitation in its memorandum decision as an additional basis for dismissing the 
claims of the legal heirs. In a somewhat curious comment, the court noted: 
Because this action is governed by the FELA, under which the rights and 
obligations of the heirs are derived from those of the decedent, the spouse 
and children of the decedent are subject to the regulations, orders and 
statutes governing the decedent's personal injury as if they were the 
decedent. 
(R- 1634; Addendum) The meaning of, or reason for this statement is unclear. It is 
apparently the court's response to the plaintiffs' argument, cited earlier in the 
memorandum decision, that: 
[N]one of [the] legal heirs were parties to the matter, and as such, the CMO 
would not apply to their separate and distinct claims for the wrongful death 
of their father. At most, argue Plaintiffs, Mrs. Kiipatrick's claims for 
personal injury damages that survived following the death may be at risk for 
failing to procure the autopsy. However, note Plaintiffs, her separate and 
distinct claims for wrongful death should not 
The court is correct that the statutes governing the decedent's case affect the heirs 
as if they were the decedent See Mellon v. Goodyear, 277 U.S. 335, 345 (1928) 
[wrongful death action under FELA impermissible where injured employee had entered 
into a settlement with his employer for his injuries during his lifetime]; Frese v. Chicago, 
B. & Q. R. Co., 263 U.S. 1, 4 (1923) [holding that wrongful death action under FELA 
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could not be brought where injured employee would have been precluded by his 
negligence from recovering in a personal injury suit]; Walrod v. Southern Pac. Co^AAl 
F.2d 930, 932 (9th Cir. 1971) [injured employee obtained judgment against employer in 
FELA action; court held that wrongful death action could not be brought after the 
employee's death because, under Flynn, a wrongful death action requires that the 
employee had a personal injury cause of action at the time of death]. The court is 
mistaken, however, in finding that anything in James Kilpatrick^ s personal injury case 
barred the legal heirs from pursuing their wrongful death action. 
As noted above, at the time he died, James Kilpatrick had valid, active, and on 
going claims for personal injury. He had complied with the court's order by signing an 
authorization for an autopsy. He was in total compliance with all the "regulations, orders, 
and statutes" governing the FELA case. The legal heirs had no cause of action until 
James Kilpatrick died. At that time, when the cause of action arose, nothing in the 
personal injury case limited their wrongful death action under FELA. Thus, the court's 
conclusion to the contrary is an error of law and must be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
The plaintiffs in this matter have been wrongly deprived of their right under the 
Utah Constitution to have their day in court. The court's orders dismissing the plaintiffs' 
claims because of their failure to produce the body of James Kilpatrick for autopsy were 
without legal authority. There was no showing of any willfulness, bad faith or fault on 
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the part of any of the plaintiffs. Such findings are essential predicates to the imposition of 
a sanction of dismissal. The absence of any such evidence makes the court's orders 
invalid- Moreover, the court's case management order itself conflicts with, and reverses 
the burden established by the Supreme Court when it adopted Rule of Civil Procedure 35 
and its procedure for ordering a physical examination of the plaintiff Because 
application of these invalid orders deprived the plaintiffs of their right to have their 
claims heard, and because there was no prejudice to the defendants due to the lack of an 
autopsy, the dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims was in error. 
Accordingly, plaintiffs respectfully request that this court reverse the judgment of 
the court and remand for further proceedings. 
DATED this ^?/Aday of June, 2007. 
EISENBERG GILCHRIST & MORTON 
)K MILD 
COURTNEY G. BROADEN 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARGARET KILPATRICK, 
I n d i v i d u a l l y , a n d a s P e r s o n a l 
R e p r e s e n t a t i v e on b e h a l f o f 
L e g a l H e i r s of JAMES 
KILPATRICK, d e c e a s e d , 
P l a i n t i f f s , 
ASBESTOS DEFENDANTS. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
C a s e No. 010901285 
H o n o r a b l e GLENN K. IWASAKI 
C o u r t ClerkflLlBi^xflfSffrSOURT 
Third Judicial District 
March 2 , 2006 
M* - 3 2006 
The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to 
Defendant Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Company's Motion 
to Dismiss All Claims of Plaintiff for Failure to Comply with 
Case Management Order No, 1. The Court heard oral argument with 
respect to the motion on February, 27, 2006. Following the 
hearing, the matter was taken under advisement. 
The Court having considered the motion and memoranda and for 
the good cause shown, hereby enters the following ruling-
With this motion, Defendants seek dismissal of the wrongful 
death claims brought by Margaret Kilpatrick, individually, and as 
Personal Representative on behalf of the legal heirs of James 
Kilpatrick based upon a violation of the Case Management Order 
(*CMO") requiring autopsy., 
Plaintiffs oppose the motion arguing DefendantsUhad an 
KILPATRICK v. ASBESTOS DEFENDANTS MEMORANDUM DECISION 
opportunity to perform a Rule 35 exam during Mr. Kilpatrick's 
life and did, in fact, do so. Additionally, contend Plaintiffs, 
adequate tissue samples were available to Defendants to evaluate 
the same evidence as Plaintiff, to wit; the cause of Decedent's 
cancer. Moreover, assert Plaintiffs, although upon his death his 
wife, Margaret Kilpatrick, was a party to the personal injury 
case, none of his remaining legal heirs were parties to the 
matter, and as such, the CMO would not apply to their separate 
and distinct claims for the wrongful death of their father. At 
most, argue Plaintiffs, Mrs, Kilpatrick's claims for personal 
injury damages that survived following the death may be at risk 
for failing to procure the autopsy. However, note Plaintiffs, 
her separate and distinct claims for wrongful death should not. 
It is Plaintiffs' position the evidence which is present for the 
Plaintiffs in this wrongful death case is the same as that which 
is available to the Defendants and the medical evidence that 
exists, and that will be forthcoming through expert opinion, is 
sufficient to prove a prima facie case as it relates to asbestos 
being the cause of Mr, Kilpatrick's death. Indeed, argue 
Plaintiffs, even an autopsy which may or may not have revealed 
asbestos fibers or asbestos bodies would not prove with certainty 
the cause of death. 
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Pursuant to the Case Management Order entered in this 
matter: 
Plaintiff's spouse or another of plaintiff's 
representatives shall produce the body of the 
deceased for one full and complete autopsy, 
including thoracic and abdominal cavities, to 
be performed by the state medical examiner or 
a competent pathologist designated by 
plaintiff's counsel unless otherwise ordered 
by the Court upon good cause shown. 
CMO §111, % 5(a) . 
Because this action is governed by the FELA, under which the 
rights and obligations of the heirs are derived from those of the 
decedent, the spouse and children of the decedent are subject to 
the regulations, orders and statutes governing the decedent's 
personal injury as if they were the decedent. 
Moreover, the CMO (a product of much negotiation and debate 
among the parties) provides that, "Plaintiff's spouse or another 
of plaintiff's representatives shall produce the body. . . ." In 
addition, Plaintiffs have-admitted that Mr. Kilpatrick signed an 
authorization for their counsel to produce a full and complete 
autopsy after his death. 
Finally, Plaintiffs' destruction of the body prejudices 
Defendant because it completely eliminates the Defendant's 
ability to find out if Mr. Kilpatrick's lungs would have 
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evidenced any exposure to asbestos over and above the usual 
background levels. 
Based upon the forgoing, Defendant Burlington Northern & 
Santa Fe Railway Company's Motion to Dismiss All Claims of 
Plaintiff for Failure to Comply with Case Management Order No. 1 
is granted. 
DATED this 5? day of March, 2006. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT T h ' r d J u d i c i a l Dwtrict 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH , — N 3 0 2003 
By 
IN RE ASBESTOS LITIGATION 
JUAW second Amended Case Management Order 
010900863^^1^3^ 
Deputy Cleric 
SECOND AMENDED CASE 
MANAGEMENT ORDER NO. 1 
Case No. 010900863 AS 
Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki 
Based upon representations by various potential plaintiffs' counsel to the judges of the 
Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, Utah, this Order is entered in anticipation of a 
substantial increase in asbestos litigation in Utah courts. 
This order is intended to facilitate the administration of those cases involving allegations 
of asbestos exposure by reducing multiple filings and hearings and by setting out orders for the 
orderly disposition of such cases. This order shall apply to all cases filed by Brayton Purcell and 
by Ness, Motley, Loadholt, Richardson & Poole in which a claim for money damages is based 
upon allegations of exposure to products containing asbestos and/or machinery calling for the use 
of asbestos ("asbestos cases"). 
L 
GENERAL PROCEDURES 
1 - Cover Sheet: A cover sheet shall be filed with each pleading. The cover sheet 
shall list the party filing the pleading and its counsel; it shall also list in a vertical column all 
other parties. 
2. Master Service List: Plaintiffs' counsel shall maintain a master service list of all 
counsel representing parties in any asbestos cases governed by this Order. Defense counsel shall 
e-mail fheir addresses to plaintiffs' counsel at the time they enter their appearances. An updated 
copy of this master service list will also be filed in the offices of Judge IwasakL It is the 
responsibility of all parties to ensure that the current master service list, as updated, is used for 
the service of all master pleadings. 
3. Service of Pleadings and Documents: Any party required to serve any notice in an 
asbestos case shall serve one copy of the document on counsel for each party as they appear on 
the service list for that individual case, and file it with the Court as appropriate. 
a. The parties may stipulate to service of any pleading, discovery document, 
or other written material by e-mail (ne-serviceM) in lieu of standard service by mail or hand 
delivery, and are encouraged to do so. Such e-service shall be deemed the same as service by 
hand delivery for computing time to file a response. 
b. No party will be deemed bound by e-service unless it has affirmatively 
stated that it will agree to such service in writing, but if such an election is made by a party in one 
case, it will be deemed effective in all cases until expressly rejected in writing. Also, if an 
attorney stipulates to e-service on behalf of one client s/he will be expected to accept e-service 
for all his/her clients. Parties may reject a prior e-service agreement if such an election is not 
made. 
4. Status of Service of Process: At the time Initial Disclosures by plaintiff are due, 
plaintiffs5 counsel shall provide a list of all parties who have been served to date and their 
attorneys. The Certificate of Service on the Initial Disclosures is sufficient to satisfy this 
requirement Defendants shall have forty-five (45) days from the date of proper service in which 
to file an Answer or otherwise plead. 
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5. Rules of Civil Procedure: The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure shall govern all 
asbestos cases except to the extent that those rules are modified by this Second Amended Case 
Management Order. 
6. Master Pleadings: It is hereby ordered that an action entitled In re: Asbestos 
Litigation, Master Case No. 010900863 AS, shall become the Master case for all cases involving 
exposure to asbestos-containing products. This Master Asbestos Case shall serve as a depository 
for all asbestos liability actions. Pleadings, discovery matters, motions, orders, exhibit and 
witness lists, pre-trial statements and other documents common to all cases shall be filed only in 
the Master Asbestos Case and not in any individual case. When counsel enters an appearance for 
the first time for a particular defendant, s/he should file his/her notice of appearance in the 
Master Asbestos Case. Counsel are thereafter required to notify the Clerk of Court of all changes 
in their address, telephone numbers, and fax numbers. 
a. In each case, the parties may, if they wish, incorporate by reference any 
specifically described master pleading, whether that master pleading is filed by that party or by 
any other party; 
b. Plaintiffs counsel should file a Master Complaint and then incorporate it 
by reference in a brief complaint filed on behalf of each individual plaintiff; 
c. Defendants are encouraged to file Master Answers and to incorporate their 
Master Answers by reference in answering the individual Complaints filed on behalf of each 
plaintiff. 
d. Any party shall have the right to move against or contest any master 
pleading as though that master pleading were filed in an individual case. 
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7. Attribution of Fault: In each case in which a railroad is included as a defendant 
and alleged to be liable under the provisions of the Federal Employers' Liability Act, that railroad 
defendant is presumed to have properly pled cross-claims for contribution and indemnity against 
all other defendants, and all other defendants likewise are deemed to have pled a general denial 
to the railroad defendant's contribution and indemnity cross-claims. Until further order of the 
Court, all non-railroad defendants are presumed to have no cross-claims against one another for 
contribution, indemnity or allocation of fault. However, consistent with § 78-27-41, Utah Code 
Ann., those defendants will notify plaintiffs' counsel, by the date set in the attorneys' planning 
meeting or upon further order of the Court, of the identity of those non-party defendants it 
intends to place on the juiy verdict form for purposes of the allocation of fault Nothing herein 
precludes any railroad defendant from bringing third-party claims for contribution or indemnity. 
8. Pro Hac Vice Admissions: 
a. Motion for admission: When local counsel seek a first time association 
and admission of an out-of-state attorney, local counsel shall present Judge Iwasaki with an ex-
parte motion and related paperwork that shall fully comply with all requirements of Utah law. 
The motion shall be filed in the master case file, bearing the case number noted on this Case 
Management Order. 
b. Scope of order: An order admitting counsel pro hac vice in a Salt Lake 
County asbestos exposure case shall provide that it is effective in all then pending actions and 
shall be effective in any future actions filed in Salt Lake County alleging damages from asbestos 
exposure. Once an out-of-state attorney has been admitted in any case pursuant to this Case 
-4-
Management Order, local counsel need only file a copy of the order admitting that counsel in any 
other asbestos-related case in which the out-of-state attorney wishes to appear. 
c. Notice of changes: Local counsel and an out-of-state attorney admitted pro 
hac vice shall promptly notify the Court of any changes in the out-of-state attorney's bar 
admission status. 
& Timing of Filings Orders for admission pro hac vice may be filed at any 
time prior to the last judicial day before trial. Motions for admission pro hac vice or related 
orders made subsequent to that time will be granted only for good cause shown. 
9. Non-waiver of Rights: By entry of this Case Management Order, the parties have 
not w aived any of their rights including, but not limited to, the right to contest joinder, 
jurisdiction, or venue, or the right to seek removal to federal court Moreover, the parties have 
not waived their rights to assert or contest the manner in which these cases shouId be tried nor 
have the parties waived their rights to seek modifications of this order in individual cases upon 
motion and for good cause shown. 
10. Preservation of Privileges: The j oint defense privilege and the common interest 
privilege are preserved to the extent allowed under the law of Utah and, by conferring or meeting 
or exchanging documents, defendants have not waived any attorney/client or work product 
privilege. 
11. Amendment of Case Management Order: For good cause shown, any party may 
move, or the court may act on its own motion, to amend this Case Management Order. 
12. Severance of Punitive Damages: The Court has taken the issue of whether to sever 
any claims for punitive damages from the compensatory damages under advisement 
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13. Amendment of Complaints: Plaintiffs may amend their comp\aint in any case, 
prior to the completion of discovery, without stipulation of the parties or leave of court, provided 
that the only purpose for the amendment is to add additional defendants to the case, and no 
substantive changes are made to the allegations against any existing defendant 
14, Dismissal of Complaints: Plaintiffs may unilaterally dismiss a case without 
prejudice at any time prior to the close of discovery in the case based upon a determination that 
the case cannot be successfully pursued. The procedure for unilateral dismissal may not be 
employed, however, if the plaintiflFor plaintiffs counsel reasonably believes that the case may be 
refiled in this or another jurisdiction at any time in the future. When Plaintiffs unilaterally 
dismiss a case without prejudice based upon a determination that the case cannot be successfully 
pursued, the presumed cross-claims for contribution and indemnity of the railroad defendants, as 
established by section 1.7 of this order, are deemed dismissed without prejudice. 
IL 
DISCOVERY: INITIAL PHASE 
1. Initial Disclosures: No later than 30 days after the filing of the first answer to a 
complaint plaintiff shall serve his/her Initial Disclosures, which shall include all of die 
information required by Ruie 26(a)(1) pVus: 
2L The exposed person's Social Security Number; 
b. The exposed person's date of birth; 
a A complete list of the exposed person's employers, with last known 
addresses and phone numbers, to the extent reasonably available; 
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d. The exposed person's medical history; and 
e. A complete list of all of the exposed persons' health insurance carriers for 
the last 10 years. 
2. Authorization for Obtaining Records: Simultaneous with the filing and service of 
the initial disclosures, plaintiff will provide to n i attoi ney designated h di tens* i ounsel signed 
original authorizations (current within 120 days) to enable defendants to obtain medical records, 
VA records, union records, income tax records, Social Security earnings records, Social Security 
disability records, Social Security Printouts, military records, worker's compensation records, 
and past or present employers' personnel records. 
a. These authorizations are for documents, pathology material, and original 
radiological films and are not to be construed to authorize verbal communications that are not 
otherwise allowable. 
b. These records described in this paragraph 2 of Section II, which are 
produced by any party pursuant to these authorizations, are determined b> the* t i >urt lo be 
authentic under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, unless specific objection is made thereto at 
least thirty (30) days prior to trial. 
c. These records are not to be filed with the Court. 
d. The attorney designated by defendants to receive the authorizations shall 
make a complete copy of all records obtained pursuant to these authorizations available to 
plaintiffs counsel. 
3. Defendants' Master Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents: 
No later than one-hundred twenty (120) days after the filing of a complaint, plaintiff shall serve a 
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copy of the plaintiffs responses to Defendants' Master Interrogatories and Requests for 
Production of Documents, together with a copy of the requested documents. The Master 
Interrogatories and Requests for Production are deemed served at the time plaintiff files his/her 
complaint 
4. Defendants' Initial Disclosures: No later than thirty (30) days after filing its 
answer, each defendant shall serve its initial disclosures. 
5. Plaintiffs' Master Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents: 
Each defendant shall serve responses to Plaintiffs' Master Interrogatories and Requests for 
Production within thirty (30) days after service of Plaintiff s responses to Defendants' Master 
Interrogatories and Requests for Production. The Plaintiffs Master Interrogatories and Requests 
for Production are deemed served at the time the defendant is properly served with process. 
6. Attorneys' Planning Conference: As soon as practicable after filing plaintiffs 
Initial Disclosures and after service has been perfected on all named defendants which are subject 
to service and are not engaged in private settlement negotiations with the plaintiff, plaintiffs 
counsel shall convene an attorneys' planning conference with all defense counsel The 
conference may be held by telephone, 
a. At this planning conference all counsel shall agree on the following: 
1. The date by which plaintiff shall identify; 
(a) the asbestos-containing products, or types of products 
manufactured or distributed by a particular defendant, to 
which he/she was allegedly exposed; 
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(b) the period of time during which plaintiff alleges that the 
exposure occurred; 
(c) the location at which plaintiff alleges that the exposure 
occurred; 
(dj the manner in which plaintiff alleges he/she was exposed to 
each identified product, and whether plaintiff alleges that 
the exposure was direct or indirect; 
(e) any documents plaintiff contends will support the 
identification of each product specified; and 
(f) the names, addresses and telephone numbers of any and all 
witnesses who will testify to plaintiffs exposure to each 
identified product; provided, however, that witnesses who 
are asbestos plaintiffs themselves shall be contacted, if at 
alt, through their asbestos counsel; and provided further 
that, to the extent reasonably possible, defendants will 
coordinate their contacts with plaintiffs product 
identification witnesses in an effort to protect them from an 
inordinate number of interview requests. 
2. Hie deadline for completing factual discovery; 
3. The date, following the close of fact discovery, by which 
defendants shall identify those non-parties to whom they shall seek 
to allocate fault; 
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4, The date by which plaintiffs counsel shall designate plaintiffs 
case-specific expert witnesses and serve Rule 26(a)(3)(B) expert 
witness reports as follows: 
(a) Injury and Damage Experts: Plaintiffs counsel shall serve 
case-specific expert witness reports with respect to 
Plaintiffs injury and damage claims; 
(b) Industrial Hygienists: Plaintiffs counsel may serve a single 
work-site specific expert witness report for all cases 
involving the same work-site if the expert is not expected to 
present case-specific testimony at trial; and 
(c) General Experts: Defendant's counsel may serve a Master 
Expert Report for any experts who will testify generally, 
and not based upon a review of case-specific or work-site 
specific information. 
5- The dale (typically 60 to 120 days after the plaintiffs designation 
of expert witnesses and service of Rule 26(aX3)(B) expert witness 
reports) by which defendants' counsel shall designate defendants' 
case-specific expert witnesses and serve Rule 26(a)(3)(B) expert 
witness reports as follows: 
(a) Injury and Damage Experts: Defendants5 counsel shall 
serve case-specific expert witness reports with respect to 
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any expert witnesses expected to testify with respect to 
plaintiffs injury and damage claims; 
(b) ljiduUu.il Hygienists: 1 Hoidajit.s1 couns* 1 may serve a 
single work-site specific expert witness report for all cases 
involving the same work-site if the witness is not expected 
to give case-specific testimony at trial; and 
(c) General Experts: Defendants' counsel may serve a Master 
Expert Report for any experts win i wi 1 i testify generally, 
and not based upon a review of case-specific or work-site 
specific information. 
6. The deadline for completing expert witness discovery; and 
7. The deadline for filing dispositive motions. 
b. If counsel are unable to reach an agreement regarding these matters, any 
party may file a motion for a scheduling conference with the court 
pursuant to Rule 16, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
c. If at any time after the Attorneys' Planning Meeting has been held and/or a 
scheduling order has been entered in a particular case, a plaintiff amends 
his/her complaint to add additional defendants in the case, a new 
Attorneys' Planning Meeting will be convened, including counsel for the 
new parties, to consider whether changes to the scheduling order are 




L Supplementing Answers to Interrogatories and Responses to Requests for 
Production: If plaintiffs or defendants have previously answered Interrogatories or Requests for 
Production, they need only supplement their answers to those Interrogatories or Requests 
pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, but required supplementation shall occur no later 
than thirty (30) days before trial, absent special circumstances. 
2. Rule 35 Examinations of Plaintiff: Defendants are entitled to arrange for the Rule 
35 examinations) of the plaintiff if living, to be conducted by a physician(s) of defendants' 
choice and at defendants1 expense. 
a. Defendants shall agree among themselves on the identity of the specialist 
who will conduct the Rule 35 examination. Under ordinary circumstances, plaintiff shall be 
examined by only one physician. 
b. In those cases where plaintiff alleges physical and/or mental conditions 
that require assessment by more than one specialist, plaintiff may be required to submit to an 
additional physical or mental examination for each condition. The need for these additional Rule 
35 examinations shall be determined on a case-by-case basis. 
c. The Rule 35 examination will be conducted in Salt Lake County to the 
extent possible. In those cases where the plaintiff is unable to travel, the Rule 35 examination 
will be conducted in the community where plaintiff resides, 
& The parties recognize that there may be circumstances under which a Rule 
35 examination may need to be conducted by a physician located outside the State of Utah. The 
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need for and arrangements pertaining to such an. examination shall be i esol ved on a case-by-case 
basis, 
3. Pathology Materials; Plaintiff agrees to provide to one defendants attorney all of 
the plaintiffs pathology materials and those original chest images in his/her possession, as soon 
as practicable, but no later than one-hundred twenty (120) days after the filing of the complaint 
absent special circumstances. 
a. The Defense Counsel to whom these materials are delivered shall be the 
custodian of the plaintiffs pathology materials, chest x-rays and related medica 1 materials when 
they are provided for examination and all parties shall work together to allow all parties to use 
these materials as needed in preparing their medical work up i ii these cases. Each defendant has 
the absolute right to examine the pathology materials, chest images, and related medical 
materials independently of the other defendants. 
b. Ail pathology materials, chest images and related medical materials 
received directly from plaintiff shall be returned to plaintiffs counsel upon completion of the 
defendants1 examination thereof. The parties may make agreements to share the costs and 
acquisition of medical records, pathology materials, chest x-rays and related materials. 
c. No destructive testing will be done without giving thirty (30) days' prior 
notice to all parties. Those parties objecting to the destructive testing shall file their objections 
with the Court prior to the expiration of the 30-day notice period. If an objection is filed, no 
destructive testing shall occur until the objection has been resolved. 
d The results of any destructive testing shall be made available to all parties 
upon order of the courL 
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c Pathology materials and original radiological studies received pursuant to 
plaintiffs authorization shall be returned to plaintiffs counsel no later than thirty (30) days prior 
to trial. 
4. Written Report of Rule 35 Examination: The defendants shall serve a written 
report of any Rule 35 examination described in paragraph 2 of this Section III, as soon as 
practicable after the examination but no later than forty-five (45) days prior to the deadline for 
completing expert discovery unless otherwise agreed by counsel. 
5, Notice of Death and Autopsy: Plaintiffs attorney, upon learning of the death of 
Plaintiff shall immediately notify counsel for Defendants of Plaintiffs death. 
a. Plaintiffs spouse or another of plaintiffs representatives shall produce the 
body of the deceased for one full and complete autopsy, including the thoracic and abdominal 
cavities, to be performed by the state medical examiner or a competent pathologist designated by 
plaintiffs counsel unless otherwise ordered by the court upon good cause shown. 
b. A showing of "good cause" may include religious beliefs and family 
preferences regarding autopsies, although these factors are not necessarily determinative of the 
issue. 
c. Appropriate and adequate quantities of tissue shall be obtained and 
preserved for inspection and review by pathologists selected by the parties and all tissue samples 
selected and preserved at the autopsy shall be made available to ail parties for appropriate 
medical and pathological testing. 
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IV. 
NO EVIDENCE DISMISSAL 
1. No Evidence Letter: At the close of fact discovery pertinent to a specific 
defendant, that defendant may, in good faith, serve a "No Evidence Letter" upon 
plaintiff. 
a. The defendant must certify in the No Evidence Letter as follows: 
(1) that the attorney has reviewed, or caused to be reviewed by another 
attorney or a legal assistant working under the direction of the 
attorney, all of the exchanged discovery; 
(2) that the defendant has provided the plaintiff with all information in 
its possession, custody, or control, other than expert witness 
reports, which are required by the Case Management Order, or 
pursuant to any discovery request or court order; and 
(3) that the plaintiffs discovery responses have not identified any 
evidence tending to show plaintiff or plaintiffs decedent was 
exposed to asbestos for which the defendant was responsible-
b. Plaintiff must respond to a No Evidence Letter agreeing to dismiss the 
defendant with prejudice and a mutual waiver of costs, or rejecting the 
letter, no later than 10 days after service of the letter. Failure to respond 
shall be deemed an agreement to dismissal. If plaintiff agrees to a 
no evidence dismissal of a defendant under this provision, the presumed 
cross-claims for contribution and indemnity of the railroad defendants 
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against that defendant, as established by section L7 of this order, are 
deemed dismissed with prejudice. This dismissal occurs only if the 
railroad defendants were also served with the No Evidence Letter and did 
not object within 10 days of service. 
c. If plaintiff rejects the No Evidence Letter, piaintiff must state the factual 
and legal basis for rejecting it. 
d. If Plaintiff rejects the No Evidence Letter and/or refuses to agree to 
dismissal with prejudice and a mutual waiver of costs, Defendant may file 
a motion for summary judgment without the necessity of awaiting 
completion of expert discovery. If such a motion is granted in Defendant's 
favor, it will also be effective as to the presumed cross-claims for 
contribution and indemnity of the railroad defendants, as established by 
section L7 of this order. The railroad defendants shall have the right to 
oppose any such motion for summary judgment 
e. In the event a defendant files a motion for summary judgment pursuant to 
this paragraph, plaintiff shall have 45 days within which to respond 
V, 
TRIAL SETTING 
1. Timing and Effect of Dispositive Motions: Except as set forth in Section IV, 
dealing with No Evidence Dismissals, motions for summary judgment shall not be filed until 
after the close of discovery- Motions to dismiss may be filed at any time after tine completion of 
discovery pertaining to the particular issue on which the motion to dismiss is based. Dispositive 
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motions granted in a defendant's favor shall be effective as to the presumed cross-claims for 
contribution and indemnity of the railroad defendants. The railroad defendants shall have the 
right to oppose any defendant's dispositive motion If plaintiff's claim s against a railroad 
defendant are dismissed on any basis, including No Evidence Letter, dispositive motion or 
settlement, then that dismissal shall also be effective as to the presumed cross-claims for 
contribution and indemnity of the railroad defendants, as established by section L7 of this order. 
2. Trial Setting: Once dispositive motions have been decided and the remaining 
parties have attempted to settle through mediation, an individual case may be set for trial. 
3. Exigent Cases: A case may be set for an exigent trial setting, which will occur, to 
the extent possible, no later than seven months after the court declares the matter as an exigent 
case. 
a. An exigent case is defined as follows: 
(i) Mesothelioma: any living plaintiff who has been diagnosed in 
writing by a Board Certified Pulmonologist with Malignant Mesothelioma, shall be presumed 
exigent 
(ii) Lung Cancer, other Cancer and other Asbestos-Related Diseases: 
any living plaintiff who has been diagnosed in writing by a Board Certified Pulmonologist with 
an asbestos related disease, and for whom the Board Certified Pulmonologist will sign an 
affidavit stating that s/he has personally examined the plaintiff and that there is a substantial 
medical doubt that the plaintiff will survive beyond six months. 
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b. Plaintiffs counsel shall file a motion seeking that a case be 
designated as exigent. Defendants shall have 14 days thereafter to object on the basis that the 
scheduled case does not meet the definition of an exigent case. 
c. Each exigent case will have a separate six-month pre-trial 
scheduling order entered, using the same basic format as the attorneys' planning conference 
format used in all non-exigent cases. Plaintiff may request a trial setting upon completion of its 
obligation to prove complete medical records, pathological materials, autopsy reports (where 
applicable) and product identification evidence. 
d- The subsequent death of the plaintiff will be considered just cause 
for returning the case to a non-exigent status unless the court rules otherwise. Issues resulting 
from the death of the plaintiff (e.g., failure to comply with formalities in regard to proper 
substitution of plaintiff, medical and autopsy issues, impact on the jury if one has already been 
impaneled, etc.) may be considered by the court in regard to a request for maintaining the case on 
an exigent trial setting. 
DATED this /O day o f X ^ ^ T , 2003. 
Glenn K. Iwasaki t% v ^ V - A 
District Court Judge \j?'?l fTi® ' 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Defendant Union Pacific Railroad Company, by and through counsel, hereby certifies that 
i tnir and correct copy of the foregoing proposed SECONi > <\ Mr-Ni )h 11 CASE 
MANAGEMENT ORDER NO- 1 was served by mailing, postage prepaid, and/or by electronic 
transmission, this 12th day of September, 2003 to the following parties: 
3M (MINNESOTA MINING AND j 
MANUFACTURING COMPANY) i 
DOMCO ] 




1 FLOUR MAINTENANCE 
[ HALLIBURTON COMPANY 
KEERS ENVIRONMENTAL 
KUBOTA CORPORATION 
TIMKEN CORPORATION, THE 
UTILITY TRAILER MANUFACTURING 
COMPANY 
i A. J. DEAN READY MIX CONCRETE 
COMPANY 
J 
STOEL RIVES, LLP 
D. Matthew Moscon Dmmoscon@,stoeLcom 
mtrasich@,stoel.com 1 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1100 
Salt lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 328-3131 
PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN, GEE & 
LOVELESS 
Patricia W. Christensen pwc(S),pwlaw.com 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1537 
Telephone: (801) 532-7840 
Facsimile: (801) 532-7750 
i GREEN & BERRY 
Raymond Scott Berry rsbeiry@xmission.com ] 
10 Exchange Place, Suite 622 I 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-5650 
[Facsimile: (801) 363-5658 j 
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ABB LUMMUS GLOBAL, INC. 






THE GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER 
COMPANY 
LOCKHEED MARTIN TACTICAL 
MODINE MANUFACTURING 
NATIONAL DYNAMICS 
STANDARD BUILDERS SUPPLY CO. 
SYSTEMS 
PLIBRICO LIBERTY MUTUAL 
SAINT-GOBAIN 
THE SKYNKOLOID COMPANY 
UNION BOILERS 
VICAR, INC. 
YEATSE PIPE & SUPPLY CO. 
ZURN INDUSTRIES, INC. 
GREFCO, INC. 






ACE HARDWARE CORPORATION 
THE ANCHOR PACKING COMPANY 
BURNHAM CORPORATION 
THE FLINTKOTE COMPANY 
GARLOCK, INC. 




CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN 
Phillip S. Ferguson 
Asbestos.Groups(a),chrisien.com 
Rebecca L. Hill 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Telephone: 355-3431 
STRONG &HANNI 
1 Joseph J. Joyce asbestos f3>,strongandhannt.com J 
9 Exchange Place, 6* Floor J 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 








FLEXATALLIC (GASKET HOLDINGS ; 
INC) 
MAREMONT CORPORATION 
PNEUMO ABEX CORRORATION 
UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION 
UNITED STATES GYPSUM COMPANY 
1 WAGNER ELECTRIC CORPORATION 
AMERICAN BILTRTTE, INC. 
ANDERSON LUMBER 
BOMBARDIER 
THE BUDD COMPANY 
HAYES LEMMERZ INTERNATIONAL 
HOWELL INC. 
KELSEY HAYES 
KIRKHILL RUBBER COMPANY 
McCORD CORPORATION 
MORTON INTERNATIONAL, INC 
OAKFABCO 
J UTAH POWER AND LIGHT CO. 
AQUA-CHEM, INC. (Cleaver-Brooks, a 
1 division of) 
SILVESTOR & CONROY 230 South 5tt East Suite 590 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
532-2266 
532-2270 (fax) 
Fred R. Silvester frs@silconlaw.com 
Spencer Sibers scs(3jsilconlaw.com 
BAKER & HOSTETLER, LLP 
Mary Price Birk Mbirk@,baker-hostetler.com 
Ronald L. Hellbusch Rhellbusch(2),bakerlaw.coin 
303 East 17* Ave. Suite 1100 
Denver, Colorado 80203 
(303) 861-0600 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH 
Ross I. Romero Rromero(g),i oneswaldo.com 
1500 Wells Fargo Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
521-3200 
MARKUSSON, GREEN & JARVIS, P.C. 
Dennis H. Markusson Markusson@mgilaw.com 
William B. Stanton Green@mgi law.com 
999 Eighteenth Street, Suite 3300 
Denver, Colorado 80202 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Rick L. Rose Rrose(2)jq acorn 
Gregory Roberts groberts(afrqn.corn 1 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Melinda A. Morgan Mam@xbmn.com 
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CONGOLEUM CORPORATION 
R V. ROBERTS & ASSOCIATES, INC. 
FLOWSERVE CORPORATION 
HAMILTON MATERIALS, INC, 







1 HOLDINGS CORPORATION 
ARVINMERITOR, INC. (Successor to 
Meritor Automotive, Inc.) 
MERITOR AUTOMOTIVE GROUP 
BOEING NORTH AMERICAN INC. 
(Successor to The Boeing Copany) 
DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORPORATION 
HANSON PERMANWNTE CEMENT, 
INC 
B J . GOODRICH 
FULTON BOILER WORKS, INC. 
JOHN CRANE CO. 
SIX STATES DISTRIBUTORS, INC. 
BABCOCKBORSIG POWER Oca. 
RILEY STOKER CORPORATION 
D.B. Riley f.k.a, Riley Stoker Corporation 
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 
531-2000 
TAYLOR, ADAMS, LOWE & HUTCHINSON 
Steven F. Hutchinson Shutchinson@tavloradams.com 
Su J. Chon Schon@tayJoradams.com 1 
2180 South 1300 East, Suite 520 1 
Salt Lake City, Utah S4106-2843 
Telephone: (801) 486-1112 
Facsimile: (801)486-1198 
SNELL & WflLMER LLP 
Tracy Fowler tfowleitSswlaw.com 
Kamie F. Brown kbrown@swlaw.com 
15 West South Temple Suite 1200 1 
Gateway Tower West 1 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1004 
SHEA & GARDNER 
David Booth Beers j 
1800 Massachusetts Avenue, N. W. I 
Washington, DC 20036 
Telephone: (202) 828-2000 
Facsimile. (202) 828-2195 
Rglazer@sheagardner.com 
DUNN&DUNN 
Robert C. Morton rmoiton@dunndunn.com J 
Susan Black Dunn sblack@dunndunn.com j 
230 South 500 East, Suite 460 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 521-6677 
Facsimile: (801) 521-9998 j 
SUITIERAXLAND 
Michael W. Homer Mliomer@suitter.com j 
Bret S. Hayman Bhavman@suitter.com j 
175 South West Temple Suite 700 
1 Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480 
(801) 532-7300 Telephone ] 
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BASF CORPORATION 
BECHTEL CORPORATION (DE) 
DEL MONTE 
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION 
GENUINE PARTS COMPANY 
KOHLER COMPANY 
NISSAN 
PARKER BOILER COMPANY 
PFIZER 
QUIGLEY COMPANY, INC. 
ROLLS-ROYCE PLC 
SEQUOIA VENTURES, INC 
STUART-WESTERN, INC. 
SUPRO CORPORATION 
TARKETT, INC. • 
[ THERMAL WEST INDUSTRIAL 
BURNS INTERNATIONAL SERVICE 
CORPORATION ffk/WBORG- WARNER 
AUTOMOTIVE 
BRADSHAW AUTO PARTS OF SUGARHOUSE 
CAPCO PIPE COMPANY 
DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORPORATION 
DEXTER CORPORATION 
FORD MOTOR COMPANY 
HANSON PERMANENTE CEMENT, INC, 
KAISER GYPSUM COMPANY, INC 
PHILLIPS PETROLEUM COMPANY 
VIACOM, INC 
THE FLINTKOTE COMPANY 
INTERNATIONAL TRUCK AND ENGINE 
CORPORATION 
J UNDERWRITERS LABORATORIES, INC 
BRIDGESTONE/FIRESTONE, INC 
(801) 532-7355 Facsimile j 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
John R. Lund Asbestos@scmlaw.com 
10 Exchange Place Suite 1100 
P.O. Box 45000 
SaltLake City, Utah 84145 
(801)521-9000 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
Dennis Ferguson Dferguson/ahvilliunt.com 
257 East 250 South, Suite 500 
P.O. Box 45678 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-5678 
Facsimile: (801) 364-4500 j 
SNELL & WEJMER LLP 
Bryon J. Benevento Bbenevento@swlaw.com 
James D. Gardner Jdgardner@swlaw.com 
David N. Wolf Dwolf@swlaw.com I 
Kamie F. Brown Kbrown@swlaw.com ] 
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200 
Gateway Tower West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1004 
BENDINGER, CROCKETT, PETERSON & CASEY 
Jeffery S. Williams Jsw@bcpclaw.com 
Sean N. Egan 
170 South Main Street, Suite 400 







HOBART BROTHERS COMPANY 
MCDONNELL DOUGLAS CORPORATION 
MILLER ELECTRIC MANUFACTURING CO. 
SIOUX TOOLS, INCL. 
INTERNATIONAL CELLULOSE 
CORPORATION 
CSK AUTO, INC. 
CUTLER-HAMMER, INC. 
D. CUMMINS CORPORATION 
EATON CORPORATION 
RAILROAD FRICTION PRODUCTS 
CORPORATION 
WABASH POWER EQUIPMENT CO. 
EXXON MOBILE CORPORATION 
FLYING J, INC 
FDCC CALIFORNIA, INC. 
FREIGHTLINER CORP. 
FOSTER WHEELER ENERGY CORPORATION 
Robert A. Burton bobb@burtonIumber.com 
PX).Box65717 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84165-0717 
(801)487-8861Telephone 
(801) 487-5815 Facsimile 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Elizabeth S. Conley Econley(2bblutah.com 
One Utah Center 
201 South Main Street Suite 1800 
P.O Box 45898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0898 
(801) 532-1234 Telephone 
(801) 536-6111 Facsimile 
THELEN REID & PRIEST, LLP 
101 Second Street, Suite 1800 
San Francisco, California 94105-3601 
(415) 371-1200 Telephone 
Send pleadings, etc^ by fax to: (415) 371-1211 
Barbara L. Maw bmaw@fre700.com 
Bruce C. Burt bruce buit@fre700.coni 
185 South State Street, Suite 340 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Fax 533-8111 
LEBOEUF, LAMB, GREENE & MacRAE, LLP. 
James K. Tracy Jtracy(S),llgni.com 
1000 Keams Building 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
(801)320-6700 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
Lynn C. McMurray lmcmurrav@kmclaw.com 
PLANT WALLACE CEffilSTENSEN & KANELL 
Mark J. Williams Mwilliams(S),pwcklaw.com 
136 East South Temple, Suite 1700 





PAGE BAKE COMPANY INCORPORATED 
INDUSTRIAL SUPPLY COMPANY 
JOHN DEERE INDUSTRIAL EQUIPMENT 
COMPANY 
KAISER ALUMINUM & CHEMICAL 
CORPORATION 
KENNECOTT UTAH CORPORATION 
HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INC. 
FTBERITE, INC 
LENNOX INDUSTRIES, INC. 
CHEVRON PRODUCTS COMPANY 
DOW CHEMICAL 
GENERAL ELECTRIC 
BAYER CROPSCIENCE USA, INC 
BURBIDGE, CARNAHAN, OSTLER & WHITE 
Brinton Burbidge bburbidge@bcowlaw.com 
Paul D. Van Komen Pvankomen@bcowlaw.corQ 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Telephone: 359-7000 
Facsimile: 236-5319 
MORGAN, MINNOCK & RICE 
Joseph E. Minnock Jminnock@lawmmr. com 
136 South Main Street, 8m Floor 
SaltLakeCity, Utah 84101 
Telephone: 531-7888 
Facsimile: 531-9732 j 
CALLISTER, NEBEKER& MCCULLOUGH 
Martin R. Denney mrdenny@cnmlaw.com j 
HOLLAND & HART LLP 
Reha Deal Rdeal@hollandhart.com 
Brent Johnson B johnson@hollaQdhart.com 1 
BALLARD SPAHR ANDREWS & INGERSOLL 
David B. Watkiss watkissb@ballardspahr.com 
James E. Magleby maglebvi@ballardspahr.com j 
Paxton R. Guymon guymorip@ballardspahr.com j 
Craig H Howe howe@ballardspahrxom 
201 South Main Street, Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, UT $4111-2221 
Telephone: (801)531-3000 
Facsimile: (801)531-3001 j 
KIPP& CHRISTIAN 
Gregory L Sanders Gisanders@jkjppandchristian com j 
10 Exchange Place, 4* Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-3773 
Facsimile: (801) 359-9004 J 
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LINCOLN ELECTRIC COMPANY 
THE PRAXAIR (Praxair Distribution, Inc.) 
HOBART BROTHERS CORPORATION 
MOUNTAIN STATES INSULATION SUPPLY 
NORTH AMERICAN REFRACTORIES 
COMPANY 
LAKELAND INDUSmiES INC. 
AUTOZONE, INC. 
PARKER-HANNIFIN CORPORATION 
SACOMO MANUFACTURING COMPANY 
SACOMO SIERRA, INC. 
STANDARD MOTOR PRODUCTS, INC. 
1 PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
; Elizabeth S. Coniey econley@pblutah.com 
One Utah Center 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
P.O. Box 45898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
Facsimile: (801) 536-6111 
CROSBY, HEAFEY, ROACH & MAY 
Albert B, Norris 
Professional Corporation 
Two Embarcadero Center Suite 2000 
San Francisco CA 94111 
Telephone (415) 543-8700 
Facsimile (415) 659-5695 j 
JOHN M. SHARP 
371 East 25* Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
Telephone: (801) 522-7122 ] 
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK Sc McDONOUGH 
Ross I. Romero Rromero@ioneswaldo.com 
1500 Wells Fargo Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
521-3200 
MARKUSSON GREEN & JARVIS 
Dennis H. Markusson Markusson@mgj law.com I 
William B. Stanton Stanton@ineilaw.com | 
999 18* Street, Suite 3300 
Denver. CO 80202 
(303)572-4200 j 
1 Barbara K. Berrett Bberrett@,bent&petty.com j 
BERRETT & ASSOCIATES, L.C. 
50 S. Main Street #530 
Salt Lake City, UT 84144 
Telephone: (801)531-7733 
Facsimile: (801)531-7711 
Nwright@berrettpetty.com (Please send to Nedra too) 
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METALCLAD 
PARSONS ENERGY <fc CHEMICAL GROUP, 
INC. 
NATIONWIDE BOILER, INC. 
PINNACLE ENVIRONMENTAL, INC. 
PLAINTIFFS 
RAPID AMERICAN CORPORATION 
SCANDURA,INC. 
SACK, MILLER & ROSENDIN, LLP 
Joanne Rosendin ir@smrlaw.com 
One Kaiser Plaza, Suite 340 
Oakland, CA 
Telephone (510) 286-2200 
Facsimile (510) 286-8887 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN 
Dale 1 Lambert Asbestos.Groups@chrisien.com 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Telephone: (801) 323-5000 
Facsimile: (801) 355-3472 
ROCKWELL D. SHUTJER 
4244 South Rowland Drive 
Salt Lkae Ciyt, Utah 84124 
BRAYTON PURCELL 
Robert G. Gilchrist 
S. Brook Millard 
215 So State Street, Ste 900 




MCCONNELL SCDERIUS FLEISCHNER 
HOUGHTALING & CRAIGMILE 
James M. Miletich jmiletich@msflic.com 
2401 - 15th Street, Suite 300 
Denver, CO 80202 
Phone: (303)458-9545 
Todd S. Winegar ToddWinegar@azbar.org 
201 South Main Street, Suite 900 
P.O. Box 353 
| Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
! Telephone: (801) 364-9995 
1
 Facsimile: (801) 533-2626 j 
SEDGWICK, DETERT, MORAN & ARNOLD 
Reynold M. Martinez rervrooldmartmez@sdma.com 
One Embarcadero Center, 16th Floor 
San Francisco, California 94111-3628 
(415)731-7900 Telephone 
(415) 781-2635 Facsimile ] 
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UNITED STATES WELDING 
UTAH AUTO PARTS 
WATERMAN STEAM CORPORATION 
MARINE TRANSPORT LINES, INC. 
DELTA STEAMSHIP LINES, INC. 
CHIQUITA BRANDS INTERNATIONAL, INC. 
CENTRAL GULF LINES, INC. 
WESTERN READY MIX CONCRETE CORP. 
WE YERHAUSER CORPORATION 
WHEELER MACHINERY COMPANY 
MACKE Y, PRICE & WILLIAMS 
Gifford W. Price 
57 West 200 South, Suite 350 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 575-5000 | 
DURHAM JOENS & PINEGAR 
Bryan J. Pattison bpatti son@diplaw.com 
Michael F. Leavitt mleavitt @djpiawxom 
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
Ross I. Romero Rromero@ioDeswaldo.com 
1500 Wells Faigo Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
521-3200 
THOMPSON HINE LLP 
Richard C Bin2ieydick.binzlev@thompsonhiDe.c0m 1 
3900 Key Center 
127 Public Square 
Cleveland, OH 44114-1291 
Telephone: 216-566-5500 
Fax:216-566-5800 
E. H. FANKHAUSER 
243 East 400 South Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
EMARD DANOFF PORT & TAMULSKI 
Andrew I. Port aport@edptlaw.com J 
49 Stevenson Street, Suite 400 
San Francisco CA 94105 J 
Telephone: (415) 227-9455 
Facsimile: (415) 227-4255 
KESLER& RUST 
Scott O. Mercer SOM@kesler-nist.com 1 
36 South State, Suite 2000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-8000 
Facsimile: 531-7965 j 
GLA\^> tc\ t^\ r^ f Jtk 
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